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Whitehall and the Iraq War:  
The UK's Four Intelligence Enquiries 
 
Richard J. Aldrich* 
 
 
During a period of twelve months, lasting between July 2003 and July 2004, Whitehall 
and Westminster produced no less than four different intelligence enquiries. Each 
examined matters related to the Iraq War and the ‘War on Terror’. Although the term 
‘unprecedented’ is perhaps over-used, we can safely say that such an intensive period of 
enquiry has not occurred before in the history of the UK intelligence community. The 
immediate parallels seemed to be in other countries, since similar investigations into 
‘intelligence failure’ have been in train in the United States, Israel, Australia and even 
Denmark. These various national enquiries have proceeded locally and largely 
unconscious of each other existence. However, the number of different enquiries in the 
UK and the extent of the media interest recalls the ‘season of enquiry’ that descended 
upon the American intelligence community in 1975 and 1976.1
 
 
Although the intensity of the debate about connections between intelligence and the core 
executive was considerable, the overall results were less than impressive. The remits of 
all four UK enquiries were narrowly drawn. Initially the focus was ‘the dossiers’ 
published by No.10 Downing St, one dossier in September 2002 on Iraq’s Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD), the other dossier in February 2003 on Iraq and its security 
services. Later, the focus shifted to the death of the unfortunate Dr David Kelly, a WMD 
expert working for the Ministry of Defence, and then finally to the performance of the 
intelligence services themselves. Public attention was concentrated upon the extent to 
which these enquiries might produce 'incriminating facts'. Meanwhile, wider observations 
and reflections about intelligence were not much in evidence.2
 
  
By mid-2003, the UK political class had convinced itself that in some sense intelligence 
had been 'fixed' or heavily distorted by political pressures. While there can be no doubt 
that intelligence was artfully selected to present what officials have called 'the best 
possible case for war', these were largely matters of over-simplification and exaggeration. 
While the cautious qualifications of intelligence analysts were stripped away, the basic 
story was not changed significantly by the publicity teams. This was more a case of 
'intelligence failure'.3 We now know that most western intelligence agencies got it wrong, 
believing that Saddam Hussein had some existing WMD capability and thought that he 
was seeking to enhance it. This included not only the intelligence communities of the 
United States and Israel, who had long-voiced anxieties about these matters, but also the 
intelligence communities of countries like Germany, who enjoyed significant intelligence 
capability in the Middle East. Some waverers were convinced by the extent to which the 
German foreign intelligence service - the BND - agreed about the existence of Iraqi 
WMD, despite the fact that Berlin opposed military intervention. In retrospect the BND 
has not chosen not to probe its own record publicly.4 
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Journalists and politicians were therefore barking up the wrong tree. Although omissions 
and misrepresentations regarding Iraqi WMD certainly occurred along the UK's path to 
war, any real sleight of hand probably lay in other areas. There was misrepresentation 
about the ambiguous and hesitant nature of the Attorney-General’s advice on the legality 
of war, initially described to the public as unproblematic. More importantly there was an 
attempt to disguise the point at which Washington decided on war with Iraq and the early 
moment at which the UK decided on support for Washington's policy.5 There were also 
issues about military operations that were conducted by the allies before the expiry for 
the deadline set for Iraq's compliance on WMD.6
 
 
In all these matters, UK observers were hampered by a shortage of whistleblowers. The 
only exception was the decision of Katherine Gunn, a translator at Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the UK's signals intelligence agency, to reveal 
an email from the US National Security Agency, concerning the targeting of 
eavesdropping on the United Nations. Although arrested, the government case against her 
was quickly dropped when her defence team appeared likely to probe the issue of the 
Attorney-General's advice on war and this inadvertently steered blundering journalists 
back towards more promising lines of enquiry. The ambivalent text of the Attorney-
General’s full advice was eventually leaked in February 2005. No-one else squealed. 
Some half a dozen intelligence officers decide to depart from the Secret  Intelligence 
Service (SIS) because of unhappiness over Iraq and other issues related to the public 
exposure of intelligence at a time when that service has been re-engaging staff aged over 
sixty-five. However, these individuals did not speak publicly. Some went to jobs in the 
private sector and others were allowed to move sideways into alternative roles around 
Whitehall. Every effort was made to accommodate them.7
 
  
The obsession with the idea of political interference in intelligence, rather than the issue 
of intelligence performance, is certainly one reason why the more nuanced aspects of this 
remarkable year of enquiries have been overlooked.  However, matters were also made 
difficult by the nature of the four enquiries themselves, which were all problematic in 
different respects. The first enquiry by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, reporting in July 2003, was remarkably politicised. The second enquiry by the 
Intelligence and Security Committee, reporting in September 2003, placed a narrow 
interpretation on a narrow remit. In January 2004, a third enquiry chaired by Lord Hutton 
into the death of Dr David Kelly reported. Although delivering much classified material 
into the public domain it was not formally focused on intelligence. A final enquiry into 
intelligence and WMD, chaired by Lord Butler, reported in July 2004. Although this was 
seemingly the most important, it was carefully steered away from issues of how 
intelligence connected with high-level decisions. Moreover, the chairs of the various 
enquiries were open to ingenious argument about the need for secrecy to override 
accountability.  
 
Notwithstanding this, these enquiries generated fascinating material. Imperfect as they 
are, they tell us much about the current UK intelligence system.  This short essay 
attempts to review these four enquiries in turn, ignoring the vexed matters of probity and 
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propriety. Instead it asks what insights into UK intelligence we might divine from each 
one.    
 
 
1. The Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (FAC) 
 
The first enquiry was launched by the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, chaired by the stalwart Labour MP, Donald Anderson.8 Often referred to as the 
FAC enquiry, it was no stranger to issues of WMD, counter-terrorism and even perhaps 
intelligence, having considered these in several previous reports.9 Its purpose in this 
enquiry was to establish whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), within 
the framework of government as a whole, presented 'accurate and complete information' 
to Parliament in the run up to war, especially with regard to WMD.10
 
 
The FAC enquiry showed that the decision to release intelligence material to the public in 
the form of dossiers which had been honed by the No.10 publicity machine was an 
important factor, perhaps the key factor, in determining how it was received. Pre-existing 
relations between Fleet Street and the No.10 press machine were already unhappy. After 
examining the first dossier produced on Iraqi WMD in September 2002, many Whitehall 
journalists leapt to the conclusion that the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had been 
under strong political pressure to change its line.  One of the most interesting aspects of 
the FAC enquiry was the manner in which it revealed the phenomena of 'Groupthink' in 
several places. The term 'Groupthink' has been widely used with regard to intelligence on 
Iraq and other intelligence failures, but it applied no less to the gentlemen of the press. 
On rather limited evidence they 'assessed' that there had been political meddling. The 
furore generated by public accusation and counter-accusation eventually resulted in the 
resignation of the BBC Director-General, Greg Dyke.11
 
 
The FAC enquiry came to right conclusion. It asserted that on the evidence, Alistair 
Campbell ‘did not exert or seek to exert improper influence’ on the drafting of the 
September 2002 dossier on WMD.  They also concluded that the claims made in the 
September dossier were probably ‘well founded’ on the basis of the intelligence then 
available, albeit the emphasis given to some particular facts was peculiar. In short 
‘allegations of politically inspired meddling’ could not be established.12  They correctly 
observed that the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London had produced a 
report on Iraqi WMD shortly before the government dossier of September 2002 and had 
come to much the same conclusions.13
 
  
Journalists were not the only profession vulnerable to 'Groupthink'. In reality, almost all 
intelligence analysts, including those who had been associated with UNSCOM and 
UNMOVIC, believed that Iraq still had some WMD capability.14  In fairness, not all 
believed that the programme had been much enhanced and many were of the view that 
Iraq’s activities did not constitute a threat to the UK, or warrant military intervention. 
However, the spectrum of opinion was delimited by a reluctance to question conventional 
wisdom. There was a systemic belief - almost an ideological conviction - that all 
militarist dictators wish to acquire WMD and that they are all working busily to acquire 
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them. This belief was so entrenched that the possibilty that Iraq had no WMD was not 
really considered. In other words, a lack of current evidence of WMD could not simply 
mean that there were no WMD. All were wrong to a greater or a lesser degree. 
 
What FAC also showed was that the tendency to believe that Saddam had 'something' 
was reinforced by other factors. First, Iraq’s deliberate obstruction of the weapons 
inspectors throughout the 1990s, and second, the fact that the western intelligence 
agencies got things in Iraq wrong in the past. In 1991 they not only failed to spot the 
invasion they also underestimated Saddam’s strategic weapons programme. Although 
over a decade had intervened between 1991 and the dossier of September 2002, it is 
important to remember that analysts (like Dr David Kelly) often spend their entire career 
in this highly specialist field. Those who underestimated Iraq's WMD in 1991 were the 
same people who were doing the overestimating in 2002. Understandably perhaps, they 
did to wish to have egg on face a second time.15
 
 
Although the FAC enquiry found it hard to uncover specific detail on WMD intelligence, 
relying on off the record briefings, it scored some success in examining a later ‘dossier’, 
produced in February 2003 concerning Saddam’s mendacious security apparatus.16 The 
dossier said little about its origins other than the fact that it was informed by a variety of 
sources including ‘intelligence material’. In reality it proved to have been largely 
plagiarised by the government’s Coalition Information Centre (CIC) from three articles 
by Ibrahim al-Marashi, a Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
of the Monterey Institute of International Studies and also a D.Phil student at St Antony’s 
College Oxford.17  The government had committed several blunders here. The 
schoolboy-style plagiarism cast a veil of dishonesty over all the material issued in 
‘dossier’ form. The co-option of the research student without his permission was not only 
unethical but also potentially exposed members of his family, who still lived in Iraq, to 
real risk. Moreover, the ability of academics to map the way in which key words in the 
dissertation had been changed, offered FAC a precise guide to how the CIC was seeking 
to sell its story.18 While one of the plagiarised articles comments that the Iraqi security 
service had a role in ‘aiding opposition groups in hostile regimes’, the CIC changed this 
in their dossier to ‘supporting terrorist organisations in hostile regimes’.19 Some of the 
anonymous drafters from CIC were tracked down and 'dossier-ology' emerged as a new 
science.20
 
  
However, wider issues were missed. Arguably, the saga of the dossiers revealed 
remarkable incompetence in the matter of how to put intelligence into the public domain 
in order to inform policy debate. The appearance of the dossiers had brought forth the 
comment that this had never happened before. Strictly speaking this was not the case. 
Although civil servants behaved as if they had never done this before, government in fact 
had long experience of putting intelligence material into the public domain in order to 
justify policy. During the Cold War, the UK ran a department of the Foreign Office, the 
Information Research Department, that did little else except place intelligence material 
into the public domain with the co-operation of journalists. A similar unit, Information 
Policy, existed in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s that made intelligence material 
available to journalists.21 SIS had made extensive material available to writers for several 
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books on Soviet espionage. More broadly, over the last twenty years, much reportage on 
matters relating subjects such as terrorism in the Middle East was in fact provided to 
journalists through a well-developed system of Whitehall contacts.22
 
 
The issue of how to place intelligence material in the public domain became more 
important during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Some of this related to material 
derived from overhead imagery assets that revealed the scale of the humanitarian disaster 
and pointed to war crimes, underpinning UK assertions that intervention was necessary. 
At a later point, similar issues occurred relating to the extent to which material gathered 
by GCHQ might be used to inform the activities of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia.23 Overall, a great deal of experience was gained during these 
difficult episodes. At the end of the 1990s a classified review was conducted that sought 
to learn some of the intelligence lessons offered by the Yugoslavia experience. One of the 
major recommendations was that more thought had to be given to the issue of how 
intelligence material was put into the public domain to inform policy and public debate. 
However during 2002 and 2003 there was no evidence that this long and extensive 
experience had been remembered, still less applied.24
 
 
All these years of experience pointed to one thing. Journalists, are more inclined to trust 
spies than spin doctors. Had government chosen to release sanitised JIC papers rather 
than to craft dossiers containing selected JIC material, many misunderstandings would 
have been avoided. Ultimately, government was forced to do this anyway. The FAC 
enquiry had sections of a JIC report read out to them by Robin Cook. Later, the Butler 
report reproduced large sections of JIC reports in order to show us what we should have 
seen a year before. Moreover, the witnesses that were eventually paraded before the 
Hutton enquiry could have been made available to a parliamentary select committees at 
an earlier stage. Allowing the chair of the JIC, or staff from the Defence Intelligence 
Staff, to take a limited range of questions would have carried weight. This is not to 
suggest that the policy outcomes would have been different, but the public understanding 
of the difficulties involved in assessing WMDs would have been stronger.25
 
 
The FAC enquiry was part of a wider programme of work undertaken by the select 
committees of the House of Commons. Since their reform and re-invigoration in the 
1980s these committees have provided one of the UK's main systems of scrutiny and 
accountability. They are one of the main portals for interchange between Whitehall and 
Westminster.26
 
 Accordingly, the most striking aspect of the FAC report is the section 
dealing with co-operation - or lack of it - from the intelligence services. In Whitehall-
speak the intelligence chiefs 'blanked' the FAC enquiry. The committee addressed this 
issue forthrightly:  
We are strongly of the view that we were entitled to a greater degree of co-operation 
from the Government on access to witnesses and to intelligence material. Our 
Chairman wrote to … the Cabinet Office Intelligence Co-ordinator; the Chairman of 
the Joint Intelligence Committee; the Chief of Defence Intelligence; the Head of the 
Secret Intelligence Service; and the Director of GCHQ. None of them replied. It was 
the Foreign Secretary who informed us that they would not appear. … We asked for 
direct access to Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessments and to relevant FCO 
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papers. That was refused, although some extracts were read to us in private 
session.27
 
 
 
The frustrations experienced by the FAC enquiry in attempting to interrogate the UK 
intelligence process are interesting from the point of view of accountability. In the past, 
many have argued that the UK’s main intelligence oversight mechanism, the Intelligence 
and Security Committee (ISC), created in 1994, should have been set up as an additional 
Parliamentary Select Committee. Advocates of the select committee model for 
intelligence accountability have asserted that it would be more appropriate for such a 
committee to report to Parliament. Instead the current ISC reports to the Prime Minster 
and a sanitized version of its report, which replaces sensitive material with asterisks, is 
later released to Parliament and the public. In short, ISC is a committee of 
parliamentarians, but is owned by the Prime Minister.28
 
  
Significantly, FAC used its report to recommend that the ISC be reconstituted as a 
parliamentary select committee.29 It argued that ministers were using the existence of the 
ISC to block their own access to intelligence related matters that fell within legitimately 
the ambit of foreign affairs. However, FAC's experience contradicts its own 
recommendation. Although critics of the current ISC have long argued that formal select 
committee powers would allow the ISC to sequester documents and to compel witnesses 
to appear before it (ISC currently cannot do this) FAC's experience with intelligence 
matters suggests that these formidable select committee powers exist largely in name 
only. In practice, as we know from parallel American episodes, the factor that determines 
effectiveness is size of supporting staff. Adequate support staff are enjoyed neither by 
ISC, nor by any of the Parliamentary select committees. However, as we shall see, the 
ISC, armed with its single intrepid investigator, was at least inside the ring of secrecy. 
Comparing the efforts of FAC and ISC suggests that the configuration of the current ISC 
is more effective for its current purpose, albeit the ISC experience was not without its 
problems.30
 
  
  
 
 
 
2. The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) 
  
The ISC was set the task of enquiring into whether intelligence on Iraqi WMD was 
properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in government publications. In 
common with FAC they came the conclusion that the journalists had been wrong in their 
more specific allegations. They noted that the September 2002 dossier on Iraqi WMD had 
been endorsed by the JIC and that it drew on the intelligence assessments then available. 
They also agreed that it was not ’sexed up’ by Alastair Campbell or any other member of 
the No.10 public relations team.31
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Just like FAC, the need for ISC to slay the pervasive myth of gross political interference 
prevented it from reflecting more widely. Admittedly, poring over the minute issues of 
language and tracking what Alastair Campbell did and did not do, was what ISC was 
tasked with. However, it also has to be said that these detailed tasks came naturally to 
ISC, since its historic tendency has been to examine work-a-day issues of costs and 
efficiency rather than to think about more strategic questions. Major issues are sometimes 
identified by ISC, but they are rarely addressed or explored in any depth.  For example, 
the ISC noted that it needed to report on how intelligence was placed in the public 
domain and on relations between the intelligence services and the media. It promised to 
investigate this area once the Hutton enquiry had reported in January 2004. However, in 
the event its 'findings' on this matter were weak, being limited to a couple of pages in its 
report of 2004-5. Its comments on this important subject consisted of a statement of 
known facts and some platitudinous observations. The issue of how government might 
put intelligence material into the public domain still awaits serious investigation.32
 
   
When looking at specifically at Iraqi WMD, the ISC found significant material but did 
seem to know what to do with it. It noted that the dossier had talked about the Iraqis 
'continued’ production of chemical and biological weapons in its foreword. It also 
identified that in reality, the UK had no information to show 'continued' production or 
any intelligence about the amounts of agents produced. The JIC ‘did not know what had 
been produced and in what quantities’. In other words this was not an estimate - it was a 
guestimate. It had 'assessed' that production had continued to take place, but this 
assessing was little more than a hunch. The ISC merely observed that this 'uncertainty 
should have been highlighted’ to give a balanced view.33
 
 
This issue was significant because it shed light on the general nature of ‘estimating’ 
biological and chemical weapons stocks. The JIC was merely doing what it had done for 
half a century. The evidence of several decades, and especially on the issue of chemical 
and biological weapons, suggests that it is almost impossible for the JIC to get it right. 
Whatever decade we pick we can find assertions by the JIC that these weapons are a  
very hard target and the only thing it was sure about was it was unlikely to get this 
right.34
 
 This problem is not about to change. It follows logically from this that any policy 
of pre-emption based on unqualified assertions about WMD stocks was heading for 
trouble.  Given that the UK and the US spent much of 2002 emphasising their shift 
towards new strategies of pre-emption this surely deserved further comment, perhaps 
extensive comment. It is in the nature of things that intelligence-led policies in this area 
are going to be wrong much of the time. This was the sort of strategic issue that ISC 
should have addressed, but in practice was inclined to avoid. 
In retrospect, we can also chart some odd discrepancies between the committees. Indeed, 
the committees themselves found comparison hard to resist. FAC had chosen to comment 
on ISC, while ISC responded to FAC in a special annex. On the main issue, namely did 
the unclassified dossier largely reflect the classified assessments, FAC and ISC were in 
step. However, ISC took issue with FAC's statement that the UK was ‘heavily reliant’ on 
US intelligence including material from defectors or exiles. It asserted confidently that 
the UK intelligence community had ‘a number of their own reliable sources, including 
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sources in Iraq’.35  ISC’s implication that UK intelligence sources concerning Iraq were 
in any sense 'reliable' were roundly contradicted by the later Butler Report, which 
revealed SIS reporting on Iraq as notably weak. One is inclined follow Butler and not ISC 
on this matter.36
 
  
Both Butler and ISC disagree with FAC on the vexed issue of exiles and defectors, 
insisting that in contrast to Washington they played no part in the Whitehall picture. 
Defectors are notorious in the world of intelligence for 'gilding the lily', or exaggerating 
the value of the information that they carry. However, the former FCO Minister Ben 
Bradshaw told the FAC in April 2003 that, after the departure of the UN inspectors in 
1999, the bulk of the evidence informing UK policy 'was based on intelligence, is based 
on defections and is based on what we know the Iraqi regime has tried to import.’ Who 
were these defectors that Bradshaw refers to? It is likely that this is a reference to CIA 
material provided to Whitehall by Washington.37
 
 A comparison of FAC, ISC and Butler 
reveals odd disparities and perhaps indicates the limits of the ability of ISC to probe some 
of these matters. Ultimately, ISC is only just inside the ring of secrecy and to an extent 
has to believe what it is told. 
 
 
 
3. The Hutton Report on Dr David Kelly (Hutton) 
 
Lord Hutton's report was specifically an investigation into the circumstances surrounding 
the death of David Kelly. Nevertheless, intelligence was woven into the fabric of its 
deliberations and much time was spent exploring the issue of September 2002 dossier on 
WMD. Hutton re-affirmed the view taken by both FAC and ISC that the dossier broadly 
reflected the JIC material and did not contain deliberate distortions. Not unlike the Scott 
enquiry of 1996, this investigation was run by a judge with the result that the gathering of 
evidence was meticulous. However, like Scott, Hutton did not know very much about 
intelligence. Accordingly, the report written by Lord Hutton was dry and seemed to move 
past some of the most interesting evidence that he had gathered. Nevertheless, for those 
who took time to peruse the raw material there were fascinating things to read. Two short 
examples will serve here. 
 
First, the Hutton enquiry unearthed e-mails that suggested that the more important  
figures around the Prime Minster were aware that the evidence concerning Iraqi WMD 
was rather thin. The missing figure here is the Cabinet Secretary, who remains a cypher 
in the whole affair. However, Hutton did secure an e-mail written by Jonathan Powell, 
Blair's Chief of Staff,  to the Chair of the JIC, John Scarlett. On the eve of publication of 
the September 2002 dossier, Powell observed:  
 
The document does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat, 
from Saddam. … . . . We will need to make it clear in launching the document that 
we do not claim that we have evidence that he is an imminent threat … if I was 
Saddam I would take a party of western journalists to the Ibn Sina factory or one of 
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the others pictured in the document to demonstrate there is nothing there. How do 
we close off that avenue to him in advance?  
 
Perhaps more than any other document, this e-mail captures the proactive nature of No.10 
Downing Street in the autumn of 2002.38
 
  
Proactivism was revealed by the Hutton enquiry in a second piece of evidence. Taking 
evidence from a UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, Hutton uncovered an SIS 
propaganda operation. Whitehall later confirmed that SIS had developed an operation to 
gain public support for sanctions and the use of military force in Iraq. This was called 
'Operation Mass Appeal' and was designed to place stories in the media about Saddam 
Hussein’s nerve gas stocks.39 This revelation was especially interesting, given that some 
observers have long maintained that while the SIS capability for para-military activities is 
small, much effort is put into information operations. In 2005, Lord Butler also expressed 
interest in this operation.40
 
  
More broadly, the Hutton enquiry underlines the manner in which one revelation leads to 
another. Although, as this essay makes clear, over time much intelligence had been 
placed in the public domain through 'private channels' and off the record briefings, the 
dossiers did this more ostentatiously. Once this line had been crossed, the argument could 
always be made to reveal a little more. Doubtless, those working on the JIC reports and 
dossiers of 2002 and 2003 had no inkling of just how much would be revealed about UK 
intelligence by the time the various enquiries had completed their business. Hutton shows 
us that the placing of intelligence material in the public domain usually leads to the 
release of further material, perhaps more than one would wish.  Individual civil servants 
were inclined to draw similar, but perhaps more personal conclusions. Intelligence 
officers and policy advisers alike learned that in the twenty-first century everything is 
disclosable. Hutton underlined this point by discussing remarkable emails that revealed 
the casual style of new government in No.10. In 2003 no-one would have dreamed that 
such material would make its way onto an enquiry website. Perhaps this was a 'e-Gov' of 
a kind that Whitehall had not really envisaged.  
 
It is hard to resist the notion that the Hutton Enquiry has reinforced the new culture of 
destruction unleashed by the UK Freedom of Information Act, which was implemented in 
January 2005. The authorities announced a new era of public transparency, however, this 
was accompanied by a new private phenomena called 'shredding day'. Up and down the 
country, civil servants in even the smallest local government offices were urged to trawl 
their filing cabinets for compromising material and to dispose of it. The Freedom of 
Information Act is probably a good thing for journalists who want an easy way of chasing 
issues such as the expense accounts of ministers. It is probably a bad thing for political 
historians who hope that even sensitive records will eventually be available to us.41
 
  
 
4. The Butler Report on Intelligence and Iraq (Butler) 
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Lord Butler’s report stated that its remit was to focus on the performance of UK 
intelligence regarding WMD. In reality it focused on some parts of UK intelligence and 
not others. It cleared the Defence Intelligence Staff at the Ministry of Defence. It let the 
JIC off lightly and said nothing about GCHQ or about the interface between intelligence 
and high policy. It saved most of its fire for SIS, its internal structures and its weak 
product. Butler, in common with many academic commentators, liked the explanation of 
'Groupthink'. It went a long way to offering a genuine explanation of what had happened, 
but also perhaps  allowed his committee to escape pointing the finger at single 
individuals.  
 
Butler confessed himself to be shocked at the thinness of SIS reporting on Iraq. He could 
not square the lack of reliable human agent reporting with Blair’s confident assertions 
before Parliament. He stated quite simply that 'SIS did not have agents with first-hand 
knowledge of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological or ballistic missile programmes'. 
Several of the sources used in 2003 were dismissed as indirect and poor. Some of their 
reports had to be 'withdrawn' after the war had been launched but this information was 
not circulated to all the customers. 42
 
 
For almost half a century most personnel within SIS had been divided between two 
different types of sections. The first type were operational collection or 'production' 
elements, often organised by region, that recruited spies and gathered intelligence. The 
second type were the 'requirements' sections which fielded enquires from Whitehall and 
collated the material for despatch to consumer departments. They were also tasked with 
evaluating and 'validating' the reliability of the reports. In other words the operational 
elements produced the goods and the requirements sections provided quality control.43
 
 
In 1995 this time-honoured system was changed. The UK government was looking for a 
post-Cold War peace dividend. In reality there was not a lot of peace about and the scale 
of SIS’s tasks were not much diminished. Tracking the diverse conflicts of the new world 
disorder was, if anything, a harder job. However, modest cuts were called for and so in 
1994, SIS underwent a reorganisation in which the requirements sections were combined 
with the operational or collection elements. This change also reflected the introduction of 
an intranet distribution system into Whitehall called the UK Intelligence Messaging 
System.  Arguably, the new architecture involved a possible conflict of interest, for the 
producers were effectively doing more of their own quality control. This should not 
happen in any well-managed intelligence system. One of Butler’s recommendations was 
to improve quality control and a senior member of SIS has been tasked with 
implementing changes that flow from the report.44
 
  
The state of the JIC was also addressed. Butler recommended that in future the chair of 
the JIC should not be combined with other roles. (In recent times it had sometimes been 
combined with the role of UK Intelligence Co-ordinator). Moreover, he urged that the 
incumbent be someone who was used to dealing with, and presumably fending off, 
ministers and other very senior figures. He suggested this might well be a senior 
Whitehall official in his last post.  In the past the ISC had called for chairs of the JIC to 
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be drawn for the intelligence community. Butler's recommendation now reverses that 
advice.45
 
   
Even in 2005, the press continued to ask the wrong questions. While Butler was still 
taking evidence, journalists focused on the selection of John Scarlett, the chairman of the 
JIC, as the next Chief of SIS, replacing Sir Richard Dearlove. Many argued that the 
selection of Scarlett was somehow inappropriate. In fact, as an excellent field officer and 
a succesful former station chief in Moscow, he was the right man for the job. Butler, at 
least implicitly, was asking a different question.  Should John Scarlett, a rising SIS 
officer in his early forties, have been made chair of the JIC in 2001? In this position he 
was outranked by much of his own committee, including the chiefs of the three secret 
services and the two Permanent Under Secretaries. Scarlett's career had not made him an 
expert in the realm of analysis since no part of SIS does much analysis. In the 1990s, 
Scarlett has been SIS's Director of Security and Public Affairs. Butler clearly thought that 
Scarlett was a good intelligence officer, but that this particular appointment had been an 
odd decision.  
 
Butler also advanced a long-overdue argument for the expansion of the UK Assessments 
Staff and for the professionalisation of analysis within the UK system. This is not a new 
point, indeed it was made by Lord Franks in his review of the circumstances leading up 
to the Falklands War in the 1980s, but Lord Frank’s wise suggestion was ignored.46 
Given that the ISC has been in existence for almost a decade it is somewhat embarrassing 
that we have had to wait for an ad hoc enquiry to initiate a re-think about the nature and 
resourcing of assessment. This issue is so important that it is hard to see how the ISC has 
managed to miss it. The UK spends some 1.5 billion on intelligence, but this material that 
is so expensively gathered is processed through a machine on which we spend rather 
little.47
 
  
Although the JIC is often said to 'produce' JIC reports, this is misleading. In fact the 
Assessments Staff produce drafts of JIC reports which the committee members then 
approve, or adjust or send back for redrafting. What is remarkable is that the Assessments 
Staff is no bigger than it was at its creation in the late 1960s.48  This compares with the 
growth of the Cabinet Office staff as a whole (of which the JIC is part) from 
approximately 700 to over 2,500.49 UK government has always been proud of the JIC and 
the attendant assessment staff, so much so that it formed a flagship of open government 
in the 1990s, being described as 'The Central Intelligence Machinery'.50 It is all the more 
surprising then than little has been spent on the supporting staff, perhaps for decades. The 
culture of the UK intelligence system has always been known for being assessment-lite. 
So much material is fed relatively raw from the collecting agencies into operational 
departments, sometimes through deliberate stovepipes. Since 11 September 2001, we 
have heard - ad nauseam - that CIA has too many analysts and not enough human agents, 
perhaps the UK intelligence system did not have enough of either.51
 
      
Butler also expressed the hope that the Assessments Staff would be developed in such a 
way that it would be able to think 'radically'. However, Butler offered no radical 
prescriptions. Indeed, he stopped short of adopting calls from previous JIC luminaries for 
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the Assessments Staff to include secondees from outside government.52 One former JIC 
chairman, Roderic Braithwaite, had even called for the JIC to be chaired by an outsider, 
possibly an academic with an international relations background. This is not such a 
radical idea. In the United States, the most senior intelligence review group, the National 
Intelligence Committee, has been chaired by Professor Joseph Nye, who was most 
recently Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. However, 
these sorts of ideas were given no quarter by Butler and it is safe to assume that 
'Groupthink' will continue.53
 
 
Butler’s report is also fascinating for its omissions. Although it claims to be a report into 
UK intelligence, it mentions Britain’s largest and most expensive overseas intelligence 
gathering agency, GCHQ, only once. The single reference is not an especially revealing 
one for it occurs in the glossary and explains that GCHQ stands for 'Government 
Communications Headquarters'. Phrases such as ’signals intelligence’ and 'comint' are 
nowhere to be seen. It is thought that earlier drafts of the Butler report did contain some 
discussion of signals intelligence but these were removed. What these passages contained 
is anyone’s guess. Some insist that the excellent assistance that the US and the Germans 
had given to the Iraqi with communications security in the 1980s, especially the 
installation of fibre-optic cables, rendered much of their communications inaccessible. 
Others have argued that in a typically authoritarian state, Saddam’s underlings were 
exaggerating what they had achieved in the WMD field and it was this that GCHQ and 
NSA were picking up. We will wait some time before we know what the sigint story was. 
However, with this extraordinary omission, the published report (and there is no 
classified version) cannot really be said to have fulfilled its remit. 
 
Butler passes over some of the most serious issues remarkably lightly. These issues are 
all about how intelligence connects to the higher echelons of government. Butler notes 
that the Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services (CSI) is the most senior 
Whitehall committee dealing with intelligence matters. Butler discovered that it had 
never met in the seven years during which Blair had been in office and recommended that 
it should meet. However, perhaps what Butler should have said was that in 2001 the ISC 
had recommended that this committee should meet and Blair ignored them. In 2002 a 
vexed ISC noted this and ‘strongly recommended’ that the committee should meet, but 
again nothing happened in the following year. Blair’s remarkable reluctance to join with 
his ministerial colleagues to discuss intelligence matters tells us a great deal about the 
way in which intelligence interfaces with the No.10 Downing Street.54
 
 
The No.10 system is addressed in Butler’s concluding paragraphs. This section of the 
report is perhaps most interesting, but also the most arcanely worded. Here Butler 
addresses the problem of national security policy made on the sofa. Although expressed 
in the opaque language of a mandarin, there is an unmistakable dismay at an 
administration which has abandoned many formal committees and subcommittees, the 
traditional engine room of British government. Butler’s main point was that this lack of 
process means that much of the wealth of experience and judgement available in the 
system is not brought to bear on difficult decisions. Moreover, when things go wrong and 
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the accountability machine moves in, the paucity of records prevents enquirers from 
examining how decisions were made.55
 
  
Butler might have added that this new and informal style at the top was part of the 
problem for the modern JIC. As we have seen, journalists were quick to suggest that the 
JIC had somehow been suborned or corrupted. Even the FAC enquiry suggested 
(wrongly) that Alastair Campbell might have ‘chaired’ intelligence meetings. Instead, the 
problem was how a rather traditional piece of intelligence machinery, one that prided 
itself on procedure and on the delivery of objective facts, was going to adjust to a new 
style of informal government that preferred subjective policy advice. As early as 1998, 
some seasoned Whitehall observers had identified that adjusting to the new-style Blair 
machine was an ongoing problem for the JIC.56
 
  
Michael Herman, a former secretary of the JIC and also the UK's leading theorist of 
intelligence, recently reflected on the intelligence lessons that might be drawn from the 
Cold War. His comments also have a contemporary resonance that may not be entirely 
unintentional. He observed that one of these lessons was the virtue of keeping a certain 
distance between intelligence and policy, and even maintaining a certain 'intelligence 
puritanism' over the precise use made of the JIC's conclusions. He adds, intelligence 
works for government but its role should really be one of an objective assessor, ‘not that 
of the lawyer whose client wants all the help he can get in pursuing his chosen case'. In 
making this argument he follows in the tradition of Sherman Kent, who believed that a 
key role of intelligence was to speak truth to power.57
 
  
How close, or how distant should the relationship between collectors, analysts and 
policy-makers be? In the world of the professional intelligence officer this debate has 
been rumbling on for decades. Although history suggests that mixing up analysts and 
policy-makers eventually results in problems, this has nevertheless been the long-term 
trend.58 In peacetime, the increasing sophistication of secure online systems has meant 
that policy makers themselves can access more and more raw material and have tended to 
become their own analysts. In wartime, the appetite for old fashioned analytical reporting 
remains immense.59 What is clear is that the cultural context of intelligence has changed 
rapidly in the last few years. Since 9/11, policy-makers have used convenient arguments 
about new situations and 'new threats' to sweep away old conventions which they found 
irksome or restrictive, but which nevertheless reflected lessons hard-learned over 
decades.60 Press advisers and publicity people from No.10 may not have chaired 
intelligence meetings, but they certainly attended meetings of the JIC. Had anyone ever 
suggested this possibility to Percy Cradock, one-time chairman and stalwart of the JIC 
system in the 1980s, there would have been an audible explosion.61
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